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A B S T R A C T
There is extensive debate about the potential impact of the climate mechanism REDD+ on the welfare of
forest-dwelling people. To provide emission reductions, REDD+ must slow the rate of deforestation and
forest degradation: such a change will tend to result in local opportunity cost to farmers at the forest
frontier. Social safeguard processes to mitigate negative impacts of REDD+ are being developed and can
learn from existing safeguard procedures such as those implemented by the World Bank. Madagascar has
a number of REDD+ pilot projects with World Bank support including the Corridor Ankeniheny-
Zahamena (CAZ). Nearly two thousand households around the corridor have been identiﬁed as ‘project
affected persons’ (PAPs) and given compensation. We compare households identiﬁed as project affected
persons with those not identiﬁed. We found households with more socio-political power locally, those
with greater food security, and those that are more accessible were more likely to be identiﬁed as eligible
for compensation while many people likely to be negatively impacted by the REDD+ project did not
receive compensation. We identify three issues which make it difﬁcult for a social safeguard assessment
to effectively target the households for compensation: (a) poor information on location of communities
and challenging access means that information does not reach remote households; (b) reluctance of
people dependant on shifting agriculture to reveal this due to government sanctions; and (c) reliance by
safeguard assessors on non-representative local institutions. We suggest that in cases where the majority
of households are likely to bear costs and identiﬁcation of affected households is challenging, the optimal,
and principled, strategy may be blanket compensation offered to all the households in affected
communities; avoiding the dead weight costs of ineffective safeguard assessments. The Paris Agreement
in December 2015 recognised REDD+ as a key policy instrument for climate change mitigation and
explicitly recognised the need to respect human rights in all climate actions. However, safeguards will be
prone to failure unless those entitled to compensation are aware of their rights and enabled to seek
redress where safeguards fail. This research shows that existing safeguard commitments are not always
being fulﬁlled and those implementing social safeguards in REDD+ should not continue with business as
usual.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The idea of a global mechanism to incentivize reduction of
carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD
+) has gained considerable momentum over the last decade
(UNFCCC, 2014). Many tropical developing countries are embrac-
ing REDD+ as an opportunity to fund their forest conservation* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: m.poudyal@bangor.ac.uk (M. Poudyal).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.01.004
0959-3780/ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articprogrammes: for example the FAO’s Voluntary REDD+ Database
currently lists 40 countries receiving REDD+ funding for more than
1900 REDD+ arrangements (FAO, 2015). Advocates have claimed
that REDD+ offers a win-win-win (Angelsen and Atmadja, 2008):
climate mitigation while also conserving tropical forests (good for
biodiversity) and protecting indigenous rights and providing
livelihood support for local communities (good for people).
However, there are growing concerns that REDD+ could exacerbate
poverty in forest-edge communities by restricting access to land
and forest resources, especially for those with insecure tenure
(Chhatre et al., 2012; Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012). Socialle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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on local communities, have been a focus of debate in recent years
(Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Peskett et al., 2008; Peskett, 2011;
Duchelle and Jagger, 2014). The 16th Conference of the Parties of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) had agreed in 2010 to a broad set of safeguards relating
to REDD+, and that such safeguards should be ‘promoted and
supported’ while undertaking REDD+ activities (UNFCCC, 2011,
Appendix I). Furthermore, the Paris Agreement from the recently
concluded 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC has
recognised REDD+ as one of the key policy instruments for climate
change mitigation, and has endorsed all previous agreements
related to REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2015 Article 5, pp 23–24). For countries
to receive results-based REDD+ ﬁnance, they should have a
country-level Safeguard Information System (SIS) in place (SBSTA,
2012,Peskett and Todd, 2013). However, there are concerns that
existing UNFCCC requirements on safeguards are not legally
binding and therefore weak (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012;
Savaresi, 2013); and progress on core aspects of social safeguards is
highly variable across REDD+ countries (Jagger et al., 2014).
Furthermore, there are multiple REDD+ safeguards standards
linked to the bodies involved in funding REDD+ projects and
associated activities linked to REDD+, such as REDD readiness
activities at the national level. Commentators have noted that
these different standards do not align, including on key aspects
such as Free Prior Informed Consent (Arhin, 2014; Savaresi, 2013),
and range in their approach from prevention and mitigation of
negative impacts (‘risk-based approach’), to proactively seeking to
improve livelihoods and welfare of the people (Arhin, 2014;
McDermott et al., 2012; Roe et al., 2013).
There is a detailed literature highlighting the challenges of
targeting external development projects in rural areas: local elitesFig. 1. Map of the Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) Protected Area and the study sit
& Reserves within the corridor is shown on the left, with the location of the study site in t
the centre of the Ampahitra fokontany, primary access points to the villages, and the locat
data and was not available in advance.(who are less poor and more inﬂuential locally) will tend to capture
the attention of outsiders and push their view of what ‘the
community’ needs and how it should be provided (Chambers,1983,
pp 18, 160–167). Social safeguards in a REDD+ project involve
assessing who will lose out due to the project and how this loss
should be compensated. Concern has been expressed that the
process of social safeguards assessments, and beneﬁt sharing, in
REDD+ projects, is vulnerable to local elite capture (Pascual et al.,
2014); meaning the process introduced to protect the interests of
the poor can in fact exacerbate social inequalities.
REDD+ social safeguards are not being built in a vacuum;
multilateral and bilateral donors (such as the development banks)
already have social safeguard systems in place for projects they
fund (Hall, 2007; Roe et al., 2013). In recent years, the World Bank
has also become a major funding body for REDD+ through its Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). It has been argued that World
Bank safeguards, although substantially overlapping with UNFCCC
safeguards in their content, differ in their approach to implemen-
tation. They aim to prevent and mitigate negative impacts without
any requirements to show additional social beneﬁts (often termed
a ‘risk-based approach’); and are less stringent in ensuring the
rights of indigenous peoples (see McDermott et al., 2012, pp 67–68
for a comprehensive account). Since the World Bank’s safeguards
for its REDD+ funding draws heavily on its existing safeguard
policies, lessons from the implementation of social safeguards
around World Bank-funded protected areas are clearly highly
relevant to the development of social safeguards in the context of
REDD+. Given that REDD+ forms part of the global climate change
agreement (The Paris Agreement) from the UNFCCC meeting in
December 2015, it is timely to look in detail at how social
safeguards seeking to compensate those who lose out due to
conservation restrictions have been implemented on the ground,e. Zonation map of the CAZ protected area and the location of existing National Parks
he south-west corner of the corridor outlined. A close-up view of the study site with
ion of study villages on the right. NB the location of the villages comes from our ﬁeld
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safeguards under REDD+.
Madagascar started a major expansion of its terrestrial
protected areas following the commitment by its President to
triple the country’s protected areas during the IUCN World Parks
Congress in 2003 (Ferguson, 2009; Freudenberger, 2010). A
number of protected areas in the most carbon-rich biome of
Madagascar (the eastern rainforests) have been set up with REDD+
as part of the long-term funding model. Examples include REDD+
pilot projects in Makira, Corridor Forestier Ambositra-Vondrozo
(COFAV), and Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) (Ferguson,
2009; Brimont et al., 2015). The eastern rainforests of Madagascar
and the surrounding countryside are home to many tens of
thousands of smallholder famers with mostly weak land tenure,
dependent on a system of shifting agriculture (known locally as
‘tavy’) and collection of wild harvested products (Bertrand, 1999;
Hume, 2006; Styger et al., 2007; World Bank, 2012). This social
context is shared with many other countries where REDD+ is being
implemented.
In this paper, we focus on the social safeguards implemented as
part of the Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) protected area
establishment with support from the World Bank. Based on
household surveys with a stratiﬁed random sample of households,
we identify factors that inﬂuence the likelihood of a household
being identiﬁed as eligible for receiving compensation for economic
impacts from the creation of CAZ protected area. We then discuss the
challenges of implementing fair and equitable safeguard assessment
in CAZ, and the lessons this can provide for countries with a similar
social context in developing REDD+ safeguard systems.
2. Methods
2.1. Study site
Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena (CAZ) is one of the new
protected areas set up in Madagascar following the country’s
commitment at the IUCN World Parks Congress 2003 in Durban
and granted formal status as an IUCN category VI protected area in
April 2015 (Republic of Madagascar, 2015). This 382,000 ha belt of
rainforest lies to the east of the capital Antananarivo (Fig. 1). CAZ
links a number of existing protected areas including Zahamena
National Park, Mangerivola Special Reserve, Mantadia National
Park, and Analamazoatra Special Reserve. The forests of CAZ are
recognised as extremely important for conserving Madagascar’s
unique biodiversity but are under pressure from expansion of
agricultural land at the forest frontier, illegal logging and artisanal
mining (Ratsimbazafy et al., 2011). More than 60,000 people live in
over 450 villages in and around this protected area and rely
primarily on shifting agriculture, and on collecting forest products
for their livelihoods (World Bank, 2012). The Malagasy government
has been pursuing a strategy of decentralisation of management of
forest resources since 1996 (Pollini et al., 2014), and many
community-forest management associations have been estab-
lished, known locally as Communauté de Base (COBA) or
Vondron’Olona Ifotony (VOI), including in many of the villages
surrounding CAZ.
Part of the plans for long-term funding for CAZ involve carbon
sequestration through REDD+. The World Bank has been funding
the initial stages of the REDD+ project in CAZ, including
establishment of the protected area. The World Bank requires
that all projects carry out social safeguards assessment to identify
any residual social impacts so these can be mitigated (Lockwood
and Quintela, 2006, p 331). The framework for identifying those
eligible for receiving compensation to mitigate residual impacts
from the creation of the new protected areas in Madagascar was
formulated in 2003 as part of the Third Phase of EnvironmentalProgramme (PE3) funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003).
The CAZ environmental and social safeguards plan follows the
World Bank guidelines and PE3 framework in laying out the
process of identifying and compensating households identiﬁed as
project affected persons (PAPs) (World Bank, 2012). Both the
PE3 framework and CAZ safeguards plan state that anyone whose
sources of income and standard of living would be negatively
affected by the restriction of access to the natural resources due to
the creation of these protected areas are considered PAPs (ibid.).
These documents also specify the need to give special consider-
ation to the poor and vulnerable groups who are generally likely to
be marginalised in the society; this principle is central to social
safeguards of any World Bank funded project (Hall, 2007). The
social safeguard process in CAZ classiﬁed PAP households into
‘major’ and ‘minor’ categories—the former dependent on natural
resources in the protected areas as their main or only source of
livelihood; with the latter relying on the natural resources
occasionally and the beneﬁts derived not being their main source
of income. Safeguards assessment for CAZ considered households
who self-identiﬁed as users of resources from the core of the
proposed protected area, and as practising shifting agriculture, to
be major PAPs (World Bank, 2012, p 76). The initial safeguard
assessment conducted in 2010 identiﬁed 2101 major PAPs and
399 minor PAPs out of 12,383 households assessed (World Bank,
2012). All 2500 PAP households were also classiﬁed as being
vulnerable following the criteria set out by EP3 (World Bank, 2012,
p 77, 2003, pp 8–9). The list of PAPs was later revised down to
2427 households of which 1835 signed letter of engagement to
receive compensation – no distinction was made between ‘major’
and ‘minor’ PAPs, which was delivered in 2014 (in our study
villages, soon after our survey – by a process and team
unconnected to our survey). The safeguards assessment evaluated
“the losses generated by the project” on the PAP households”
taking into account “all possible forms of loss due to the new
protection area creation” in designing the type and value of
compensation (in the form of micro-projects) (World Bank, 2012,
pp xxiv–xxv, pp 101–107).
Our study focuses on a single fokontany – the smallest
administrative unit in Madagascar – Ampahitra, in the south-west
corner of CAZ, where safeguards assessments were carried out and
compensation provided as part of CAZ protected area creation
(Fig. 1). A secondary road (untarred) connects this fokontany with
the nearby town of Moramanga to the north. The three village
access points (Fig. 1) are at 10 km, 20 km and 31 km respectively
from Moramanga, and the travel times to these access points in a
4  4 vehicle are 30, 60 and 90 min, respectively in dry road
condition (these roughly double in wet conditions). Villages are
situated from 2.5 km to 6.2 km straight-line distance from the
nearest of these access points. The safeguard assessment and
compensation was only implemented in villages in the eastern half
of this large fokontany as they border the CAZ protected area; we
therefore focused our research only in these villages (Fig. 1).
Piloting and preliminary visits to communities were conducted
between January 2014 and June 2014. Sampling and data collection
was carried out between June and August 2014. We took the
approach of a detailed and rigorous study in a single area as this
allowed us to build the relationships and site-based knowledge to
ensure our sampling was truly representative of the households in
the study area (avoiding the risk of under-sampling hard to reach
households). Wider sampling of the households to cover a larger
area in CAZ would not have allowed us to carry out this study with
the same depth and rigour. We have no reason to believe that the
safeguards assessment in Ampahitra was anomalous compared
with the rest of the CAZ as the same team implemented the
safeguards assessment in the whole of CAZ following the same
assessment protocol.
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There is poor information available on the location and size of
communities in much of rural Madagascar making it difﬁcult to
develop a rigorous sampling frame. The aim of this research was to
visit a representative sample of residents of the area and compare
the characteristics of these inhabitants with those identiﬁed by the
World Bank safeguarding process as PAPs (and so eligible to receive
compensation). Therefore, building a robust sampling frame
representative of resident households within the study site was
vital to the success of this research. Using the available maps as a
starting point, we worked with the president of the fokontany and
key informants at the fokontany level to construct a sketch map
showing locations of all villages in the study area. We identiﬁed
eight villages along the border of CAZ, and in some cases lying
within the sustainable use zone based on the latest boundary
information (as of August 2013) (Fig.1). Of these, six are considered
ofﬁcial villages by the local administration and had a recognised
village chief (chef de village), while two others (labelled ‘BBT’ in
Fig. 1) lack this formal status but contained permanent residents
and primary schools. Importantly, only three of the eight villages
appeared on the best available map of the area, two correctly
labelled (Foiben-Taosarintanin’i Madagasikara (FTM), 1990)). Since
the two unofﬁcial villages were at close proximity to each other, we
considered them together as one sampling unit for the purpose of
this study. Thus, we had seven sampling units (six ofﬁcial
villages + two unofﬁcial villages grouped as one unit) which
formed the basis for stratiﬁcation of our sample. We visited each
village and carried out detailed mapping of the hamlets and
scattered households with key informants at the village level
(village chief where available or village elders). We then visited the
hamlets, and in some cases scattered households, with keyTable 1
Variables used in the model to analyse the factors inﬂuencing PAP identiﬁcation. Expec
square brackets beside each variable in the ﬁrst column.
Variables Description 
Dependent
PAP household Binary variable indicating whether a household surveyed for this stu
Person (PAP) from the establishment of the CAZ protected area. [0
Explanatory
Extra wild
harvest [+]
Binary variable indicating whether a household collects additional 
commonly collected products such as ﬁrewood. [0 = NO; 1 = YES]
Tavy seed [+] Numeric variable measuring the quantity of rice seed required to 
agriculture (tavy) plots, measured in kapoaka (a local unit roughly eq
plot area
Household age
[]
Numeric variable indicating the number of years a household has be
villages in Ampahitra fokontany
Accessibility [] Numeric variable measuring the straight-line distance (km) from a 
access point for their village on the motorable road; used as an in
Livestock owned
[]
Numeric variable indicating the total livestock ownership of a house
Unit’ (Chilonda and Otte 2006); used as an indicator of household
Food security
[]
Numeric variable indicating the number of months a household ha
per day
Literate
household
head [+]
Binary variable indicating whether the household head is literate.
COBA
membership
[+]
Categorical variable indicating a household’s membership in comm
association (known locally as COBA or VOI). NM = No membership
DM = Decision-making memberinformants to map their location with a GPS, conﬁrm the number
of households present and ask for information of other households
we may have missed. This approach required us to spend a
considerable amount of time (approximately 50 person days across
eight villages) building the sampling frame, which was a
comprehensive list of households residing within the eight villages
surveyed including outlying hamlets and isolated households. This
process also allowed us to get to know the area well before the
survey began. We identiﬁed in total 417 households residing
within our study site across the seven sampling units explained
above. With the aim of interviewing a minimum of 200 households
in total, we randomly sampled at 65% (to allow for replacement)
from each sampling unit (proportional random sampling) to obtain
a random sample of 268 households in total. Ultimately,
203 households were surveyed in total from the seven sampling
units, with roughly 50% of the households surveyed from each unit.
Of the sampled households who were approached for the survey,
only two declined to be interviewed, and three withdrew from
their interviews before completion.
2.3. Data collection and ethical concerns
In each village, we started with unstructured key informant
interviews with the village elders and, where available, the village
chief (chef de village) who is the recognised representative of the
village by local authorities. The issues discussed included land use
history, forest dependency, the CAZ protected area and the
safeguards process. At the household level, we used a structured
survey questionnaire to collect data on demographic character-
istics, land access/use, livestock holding, other physical assets and
social capital (Supplementary material). We could not obtainin-
formation about the households identiﬁed as PAPs in advance, so ourted direction of impact of the explanatory variables is indicated by the sign within
Summary statistics
Model
subsample
(N = 141)
Full sample
(N = 203)
dy was identiﬁed as Project Affected
 = NO; 1 = YES]
YES 36 (25%) 40 (20%)
wild harvested products, apart from YES 105 (75%) 147 (72%)
farm the households’ shifting
uivalent to a cup); used as a proxy for
Mean
Std. dev.
Median
237
249
150
217
219
150
en established in any of the surveyed Mean
Std. dev.
Median
14
9
11
12
10
10
household’s dwelling to the primary
dicator of household’s accessibility
Mean
Std. dev.
Median
4.8
1.4
5.1
4.8
1.4
5.9
hold measured as ‘Tropical Livestock
 wealth
Mean
Std. dev.
Median
1
1.9
0.1
0.9
1.9
0.1
s sufﬁcient food for two good meals Mean
Std. dev.
Median
6
3
6
6
3
6
 [0 = NO; 1 = YES] YES
(Missing)
87 (62%)
1
117 (58%)
1
unity-based forest management
; GM = General member;
NM
GM
DM
86 (61%)
45 (32%)
10 (7%)
136 (67%)
56 (28%)
11 (5%)
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holds’ PAP status. This helped reduce the potential for observer bias
in sampling and recording of responses. Towards the end of the
survey we included a set of questions aimed at identifying whether
the World Bank process had identiﬁed the household as a PAP.
Household heads were the primary respondents of the surveys, with
their spouses or grown-up children assisting in the recall whenever
necessary, particularly on agriculture and collection of wild
harvested products. For a few cases where the household heads
were not present (ﬁve in total), we interviewed their spouses and/or
their grown-up children; however, we still collected key information
about the household heads, such as their education level, age, and
their settlement history in the village. The questionnaire went
through two stages of piloting in neighbouring fokontany where
livelihoods are similar. RM, SR, AR and two additional assistants – all
native Malagasy speakers familiar with the dialect of the region –
carried out the interviews. MP (basic Malagasy) and NH (ﬂuent in
conversational Malagasy) attended a subset of interviews. We asked
selected households if they were available for an interview and
made an appointment at a convenient time. After introducing the
project and its objectives to the selected respondents, we explained
that participation in the research was voluntary and they could
leave at any time. In addition, we gave each household a leaﬂet
explaining the aims of the research and with contacts of the project
and photos and names of the research team. We explained that no
information that could identify them would be shared with others.
Bangor University College of Natural Sciences ethics committee
approved this study, and all members of the survey team received
ethics training before carrying out ﬁeldwork. We discussed
extensively the ethics of presenting the location of villages in this
paper, particularly those within the protected area boundary. The
existence of these communities within the protected area boundary
is no secret: some are ofﬁcial villages recognised by the localFig. 2. Straight-line distance from the primary dwellings of 184 households stratiﬁed
19 surveyed households is not available). The intercept line (0) indicates the CAZ bounda
line. Lighter dots indicate the households identiﬁed as PAPs. Size of the dots reﬂect the ho
location, on a continuous scale from a minimum of one year to a maximum of 47 yearadministration, while others are recognised indirectly through the
existence of state-supported primary school. We feel that acknowl-
edging their existence and long-term residence could help
demonstrate their legitimacy in the eyes of authorities at the
regional and national level, as many of our study villages do not
feature on any of the ofﬁcial maps currently available. We have been
careful, however, not to reveal the identity of the individual
households by removing all identiﬁers from the data sets, including
their geo-location; and by presenting data only in aggregate form.
2.4. Analysis
Based on the criteria for the identiﬁcation of the PAPs outlined
in the documents discussed above, we expected PAP households in
and around CAZ to be those who: (1) depend more on wild
harvested products for their livelihoods; (2) depend on tavy
(shifting agriculture); (3) are recently established—i.e., still have
the need to convert forest into farmland. In addition, we included
local socio-economic and political factors, which are often among
the key determinants of who beneﬁts from conservation and
development projects in a developing country context, in the
model analysing the factors inﬂuencing PAP identiﬁcation in
Ampahitra. These included: (1) accessibility of the household; (2)
assets/wealth; (3) food security; (4) household head’s literacy; and
(5) membership of the local community-based forest management
association (COBA). Table 1 provides a detailed summary of all the
variables included in our model. Given the nature of our dependent
variable, we used a binomial family generalised linear model
(GLM) with a logit link function in our estimation. We carried out
all our data analysis in R 3.2.1 (R Core Team, 2015).
The social safeguards assessment to identify PAP households
related to the creation of the CAZ protected area was conducted in
March–May 2010 following the World Bank’s environmental and by villages to the nearest CAZ outer boundary (location data for the remaining
ry with households located inside the boundary below and those outside above the
usehold age (the number of years the household has been established in its current
s). The size guide on the side provides indicative ages for ﬁve break points.
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28). Since the original safeguards assessment would only have
consideredthe households alreadyestablishedin the area at the time
of the assessment, we only include households that were established
at least ﬁve years prior to our survey in our model. This gives us a sub-
sample of 141 households for analysing the factors inﬂuencing the
identiﬁcation of PAP in Ampahitra, of which 36 households were
identiﬁed as PAPs. The proportion of PAP households in our study
obtained through ‘blind’ sampling is broadly in line with the overall
proportion of the PAP households in the CAZ (20%) (World Bank,
2012). However, to present general characteristics of our sample
and of the surveyed households we use the full sample (203
households) (Table 1). We used ‘beeswarm’ and ‘ggplot2’ packages
in R to produce Fig. 2 (Eklund, 2015; Wickham, 2009), ‘sjPlot’ with
‘ggplot2’ to produce Fig. 3 (Lüdecke, 2015; Wickham, 2009), and
‘ggplot2’ package to produce Fig. 4 (Wickham, 2009).
Before carrying out the GLM regression, we checked for
correlation between predictor variables. Because of the presence
of categorical as well as numeric variables among our predictors,
we performed three different tests to check for relationships
between them. Spearman-method test showed generally low-
level correlation between our numeric predictors, while Pearson’s
Chi-squared test for categorical variables indicated no relation-
ships between the predictors. Finally, we looked at the distribu-
tion of numeric variables across the different groups of
categorical variables to check for any systematic relationships
and found none. After estimating the GLM model for PAP
identiﬁcation, we again tested for the effect of potential multi-
collinearity in our model using variation inﬂation factor for
generalised linear model (GVIF) (Fox and Weisberg, 2011). GVIFs
for all of the predictor variables were well within the levels
considered acceptable (GVIFs for all predictors <2).Table 2
Key socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed households (in addition to those listed
valid observations for each variable.
Variables Description 
Household size (203) Total number of individuals considered member
Village-born HH head (203) Whether the respondent household head was bo
Village residency for migrants (141) Number of years since moving to the village (fo
Reason for move for migrants (141) Main reason for moving to the village (for migra
Ethnic group (203) Ethnic group to which the respondent househol
Primary occupation (203) Main occupation of the household head 
Number of rooms (200) Total number of rooms in the primary dwelling 
Roof type (201) Type of roof in the primary dwelling of the hou
Access to land (203) Proportion of households with access to at least
inheritance, or forest clearance, or purchase, or 
Tavy (203) Whether the household practices shifting agricu
Paddy ﬁeld (tanimbary) (203) Whether the household has access to at least on
Distance to centre (203) Numeric variable indicating the walking distanc
administrative centre of the fokontany in minute
Training received (203) Whether the household has received at least on
conservation/development organisations within3. Results
3.1. Household characteristics and location in relation to the CAZ
protected area
All the key socio-economic data from our survey indicate a
population living under extreme poverty and highly dependent on
forest resources for their livelihood (Tables 1 and 2). The majority
of the population lives in one-room houses built primarily with
materials collected from the forest or fallows; only six households
in our sample had a tin roof. Average livestock holding of the
households, one of the common indicators of wealth in rural
agricultural populations, are very low (0.86 tropical livestock units
(Chilonda and Otte, 2006; Table 1, Region: South Africa))—only
0.65 units per household when four outliers are excluded. On our
measure of food security, another commonly used poverty
indicator, our surveyed households could only produce sufﬁcient
food to feed their families for half the year on average. Seventy-two
percent of the surveyed households collected a range of wild-
harvested products in addition to common ones such as ﬁrewood,
indicating a high dependence on forest resources. They are also
highly dependent on forests for agriculture: with half of the
surveyed households gaining access to land through direct forest
clearance, and almost all of the surveyed households reliant to
some degree on shifting agriculture. Only a quarter of the
households surveyed had access to irrigated rice ﬁelds (Table 2);
however, these households had relatively higher food security on
average than those without access, indicating that access to
irrigated rice ﬁelds is positively associated with household wealth
(6.8 months vs 5.7 months, t-test p-value = 0.028).
Poor living conditions, relatively low literacy among the
household heads (58%), and low accessibility to the information
and other primary services as indicated by the average walking in Table 1). The ﬁgures in parentheses in the ﬁrst column refer to the total number of
Summary statistics
 of the household Mean and median: 6
Std. dev.: 2.6
rn in the village (i.e., migrant or not) YES: 62 (31%)
r migrants) Mean: 11.8
Std. dev.: 10.6
Median: 9
nts) Land availability: 107 (76%)
d head belongs Betsimisaraka: 148 (73%)
Bezanozano: 33 (16%)
Others: 22 (11%)
Agriculture: 185 (91%)
Daily wage labour: 16 (8%)
of the household 1 room: 147 (74%)
2 rooms: 49 (24%)
sehold Thatch and other plant materials: 195 (97%)
Tin: 6 (3%)
 one plot of land through
rent, or borrowing
Forest clearance: 99 (49%)
Inheritance: 73 (36%)
Borrowed: 51 (25%)
Bought: 26 (13%)
Rented: 15 (7%)
lture YES: 196 (97%)
e irrigated rice (paddy) ﬁeld YES: 51 (25%)
e from a household to
s.
Mean and median: 150
Std. dev.: 64
e training from
 the last three years
YES: 35 (17%)
Fig. 3. Odds-ratio plot for the estimated model showing the factors associated with a household being identiﬁed as a PAP. Asterisks (**) next to the value labels indicate
statistically signiﬁcant factors in the model (p-value <0.01).
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administrative centre (2.5 h), mean these households are classiﬁed
as vulnerable according to the criteria set under the EP3 framework
(World Bank, 2003).
Our analysis of distance from the primary dwellings of the
surveyed households to the nearest outer boundary of the CAZ
protected area shows that a large number of households live within
the boundary of the protected area (Fig. 2). Many of these
households were established at their current location many years
before the creation of the protected area, as indicated by the
number of years since their establishment in the village (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, some of the villages surveyed, such as SDY and BBTFig. 4. Marginal effects plot showing the combined impacts of three signiﬁcant factors (a
association) on the probability of a household being identiﬁed as a PAP, with all other fact
set ‘Close to Access Point’ (3.7 km) and ‘Far from Access Point’ (5.9 km), and ‘Low food se(Figs. 1 and 2), lie entirely inside the sustainable use zone of the
protected area; these are ofﬁcially recognised villages with
primary schools, not temporary communities of migrants. A
number of households with primary dwellings inside the protected
area had been identiﬁed as PAPs; however, the majority (82%) of
sampled households with primary dwellings inside the protected
area boundary were not identiﬁed as PAPs, including the entire
village of SDY (Fig. 2). In contrast, our survey showed that four
recently established households within our study sample were
able to receive safeguards compensation as PAPs despite not being
in existence at the time of the original assessments (Table 1).ccessibility, food security and membership in community-based forest management
ors in the model ﬁxed at their median value. We use ﬁrst and third quartile ﬁgures to
curity’ (three months) and ‘high food security’ (nine months) for these estimations.
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Results from the binomial Generalised Linear Model (GLM)
show that the two most signiﬁcant factors in predicting whether a
household was identiﬁed as a PAP or not was whether someone
from the household was a member of the local community-based
forest management association (COBA), and whether they were
among the ‘decision-making members’ of these organisations
(Fig. 3). Food security also shows a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on
whether a household is identiﬁed as a PAP or not with more food
secure households more likely to be identiﬁed as PAPs than poorer
households who lack sufﬁcient food to feed their families for a year.
Furthermore, accessibility of the households, measured by the
distance to their dwellings from the primary access point to their
village on the motorable road, was also a signiﬁcant factor
inﬂuencing the PAP identiﬁcation with inaccessible households
less likely to be identiﬁed as PAPs. The other factors included in the
model were not signiﬁcant in inﬂuencing the identiﬁcation of PAPs.
Analysis of the combined marginal effects of accessibility, food
security and association membership shows that a household with
no association membership, low food security and low accessibility
had only around two percent probability of being identiﬁed as a PAP,
with other factors at their median level (Fig. 4). In contrast, for those
with decision-making membership in the association, high food
security and high accessibility, the probability of being identiﬁed as a
PAP increased to about 85%. The probability of being identiﬁed as a
PAP increased from around six percent to around 24% as the food
security changed from low (ﬁrst quartile) to high (third quartile) fora
household living close to an access point without association
membership. Association membership has a very strong effect;
increasing the chance of a highly food secure household living close
to the access point being identiﬁed as a PAP from about 24% to about
64% if they are a general member, and to about 86% if they are a
decision-making member of the association (Fig. 4).
Although initial assessment of safeguards to identify PAPs
around CAZ was done in 2010, the actual compensation to the
households was only provided during 2014. This long gap between
the initial assessment and actual intervention – primarily due to
the political crisis in the country starting in 2009 – has meant that
recently established households in Ampahitra were not considered
for compensation, as they would not have been part of that initial
assessment to identify PAPs. In our study, these newer households
make up 30% (62/203) of the total surveyed households of which
only 45 households are migrants. Our survey results show that
these newly established households are similar to the rest of the
households in terms of their forest dependency, practice of tavy,
and other socio-economic characteristics in general. As such, these
newly established households are equally likely to be affected by
forest use restrictions from the establishment of the CAZ protected
area. In fact four of these newly established households were due
to receive safeguards compensation as PAPs. Our household
surveys and key informant interviews have suggested that some
of these newly created households were due to receive compen-
sation as PAPs because they were reported as such by their parents
at the time of original assessments even though they had yet to
form their own household at that time.
4. Discussion
Requirements regarding the development of safeguard infor-
mation systems (SIS) have been a key issue of discussion and of
contention in the international negotiations of REDD+ (Duchelle
and Jagger, 2014; Jagger et al., 2014; Menton et al., 2014). Several
organisations, especially those representing indigenous people,
have argued that current guidelines are not strong enough in
safeguarding vulnerable groups (Menton et al., 2014) and thatbeneﬁt distribution in existing projects has suffered from elite
capture (see for example, Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Platteau,
2004; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Corbera et al., 2007; Larson, 2011;
Pascual et al., 2014). In this context, it is important to note that the
Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC explicitly directs the Parties to the
Convention to ‘respect, promote and consider’ human rights, rights
of indigenous peoples and those of the vulnerable groups while
taking actions to address climate change (UNFCCC, 2015, p 21).
Most REDD+ countries already have some kind of existing system
of environmental and social safeguards, often in line with
safeguards that the World Bank and other international donor
agencies require. Therefore, many argue that a ﬁrst step in having
an effective REDD+ SIS could be to ensure existing systems are
effectively implemented, instead of duplicating systems thereby
increasing bureaucratic requirements (Lasco et al., 2013). This
makes our study of the implementation of the social safeguard
assessment of a REDD+ pilot project carried out with World Bank
funding (and so subject to World Bank safeguards) particularly
pertinent.
Our surveyed households – both those identiﬁed as eligible for
compensation by the social safeguard assessment, and those not
identiﬁed as eligible – were very similar in most of their socio-
economic characteristics apart from three key factors. First,
households containing members of local forest management
associations were signiﬁcantly more likely to be identiﬁed as a
PAP than those without members, and those with a decision-
making member of the association further increased their chances
of being identiﬁed as a PAP. Second, households with higher food
security, measured as ‘reported total number of months that all
members of the household have at least two good meals a day’, had
a signiﬁcantly greater chance of being identiﬁed as a PAP than
those with lower food security. Third, less accessible households,
measured by the distance of their dwelling from the primary access
point to their village on the motorable road, were less likely to be
identiﬁed as PAPs than those living closer to the access point. We
also observed that one village, entirely within the protected area
boundary, had no PAPs identiﬁed within it, and our interviews
there suggests that no safeguard assessments were done in that
village. Our interpretation of these results is that while the
safeguard assessment has captured many households likely to bear
signiﬁcant costs from forest use restrictions, many others likely to
bear similar costs were missed. We suggest that omissions from
the safeguard assessment are non-random and that certain
household characteristics make households more likely to be
identiﬁed as eligible to receive safeguard compensation. We
conclude that having socio-political power locally, as reﬂected by
membership of (or a decision-making position in) the local forest
management associations, is associated with increased likelihood
of being identiﬁed as a PAP (and therefore opportunity to beneﬁt
from compensation). Similarly, those with higher food security (a
proxy for wealth more generally) have a higher chance of being
identiﬁed as eligible for compensation. In addition we suggest that
many remote and inaccessible households, and in some cases
entire remote communities, were excluded from the safeguard
assessment process altogether. We interpret this as evidence of
local elite capture, a common problem identiﬁed in conservation
and development projects (Crook, 2003; Olowu, 2003; Platteau
and Gaspart, 2003; Pollini et al., 2014; Sommerville et al., 2010), as
well as of systematic bias in the assessment process favouring
more accessible households and communities, similar to that
highlighted by Brimont et al. (2015) in their study of the Makira
REDD+ project in Madagascar.
We suggest that the process of PAP identiﬁcation in the CAZ
REDD+ project has struggled due to three factors, which we discuss
in turn. We then discuss what lessons can be learnt from this study
for the development of social safeguard systems in REDD+.
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4.1.1. Poor information on the location of populations and difﬁcult
access
Of the eight villages in our study area, only three appear on
available maps and gazetteers (only two correctly labelled) despite
all having primary schools and well-established permanent
populations. In some villages not visited by the safeguard
assessment team, some households were identiﬁed as PAPs.
However, our discussions in the ﬁeld suggest that these were
households who heard about the safeguard assessment and sent
representatives to meet the assessment team in another location.
In one village not visited by the safeguard assessment team, no
PAPs were identiﬁed. It is difﬁcult to argue that people in this
community are less impacted by the REDD+ project than others in
the area as their livelihoods are similarly dependent on shifting
agriculture and, given the location of the community entirely
within the boundary of the protected area, they are certainly
required to stop this activity. A more parsimonious explanation for
the lack of PAPs in that village is that the village is difﬁcult to access
and relatively isolated from information ﬂows from the adminis-
trative centre. Indeed, our modelling of the factors inﬂuencing PAP
identiﬁcation has shown accessibility as one of the key factors
determining whether a household is identiﬁed as a PAP, suggesting
a systematic bias against those less accessible (Fig. 3). In the
context of our study, this is a surprising result given that the
households living far from the access points were mostly living
close to or even within the protected forest (Fig.1); and were just as
dependent on forest for their livelihoods if not more so. One
explanation could be that those living near the access points are
more likely to get the information about the safeguards assess-
ments, and be aware of external agents coming in the area.
Similarly, the difﬁcult terrain meant that those conducting the
safeguard assessment did not penetrate deeply into the area and so
more remote households were more likely to be omitted.
Systematic targeting of easy-to-access households (and exclu-
sion of difﬁcult-to-reach ones) in rural development projects and
government services provisioning is not a new phenomenon;
Chambers (1983, pp 13–16) termed this ‘spatial bias’ more than
three decades ago. Recent research suggest that this kind of
targeting is still a common occurrence in low-income countries
whereby off-road and difﬁcult-to-access communities are left out
(Booth et al., 2000; Porter, 2002; Francken et al., 2012). “To live off-
road is to be invisible” is how Porter (2002, p 291) characterises
people and communities living with poor road access in Ghana and
Nigeria. This statement aptly captures the situation of many of the
households and communities in our study area who were left out
by the CAZ safeguards assessment, and are literally invisible to
outsiders, as their villages do not appear on ofﬁcial maps. Within
Madagascar, Francken et al. (2012) found that both government
and NGOs allocated cyclone relief to more easily accessible areas,
often to non-affected communities at the expense of inaccessible
but cyclone affected ones. Brimont et al. (2015) also found, in their
study of Makira REDD+ pilot project, that the development
interventions related to conservation programs tended to target
‘easily accessible areas’ (p. 762).
4.1.2. Unwillingness of people to self-identify as engaged in potentially
illegal activities
There is growing literature demonstrating that people do not
give honest answers to direct questions about sensitive behaviours
such as illegal natural resource use (St. John et al., 2010;
Razaﬁmanahaka et al., 2012). The CAZ REDD+ project seeks to
reduce emissions by reducing land clearance, which is mostly
driven by shifting agriculture. Therefore, the social safeguardassessment seeks to identify those who will be economically
displaced from this livelihood within the protected area boundary.
However, there is a long history in Madagascar of state efforts to
prevent burning of forest and grasslands for farming and pasture,
including a series of anti-ﬁre legislations in both the colonial and
post-colonial era (Kull, 2002, 2004). In 2002, the then president of
Madagascar even linked the government budget for rural
communes (municipalities) to their success in eradicating ﬁre
(Kull and Laris, 2009). Furthermore, growing prominence of
Madagascar as an international biodiversity hotspot and active
presence of large international conservation NGOs in the country
has made the anti-ﬁre rhetoric stronger in recent years (ibid.).
Identifying those economically affected by the REDD+ project by
asking them to self-identify is therefore extremely problematic as
those who do clear forestland for agriculture, may not be willing to
admit this to an external actor not easily distinguished from the
enforcement authorities that occasionally jail farmers.
4.1.3. Reliance on existing non-representative institutions risks
exacerbating existing inequalities
The majority of households on the periphery of the CAZ REDD+
project are extremely poor. However, like communities anywhere
in the world (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), they are not homoge-
neous, and individuals (and the households to which they belong)
vary signiﬁcantly in terms of their social and political standing, and
ability to interact with outsiders. Studies of community-based
natural resource management institutions in Madagascar have
shown that they are often not representative of their local
communities (Pollini et al., 2014) and can facilitate elite capture
(see for example, Sommerville et al., 2010; Ratsimbazafy et al.,
2011). Local elites may act as ‘gatekeepers’ in the community
(Chambers, 1983, pp 18–19), able to inﬂuence greatly the
distribution of beneﬁts from programmes such as the social
safeguard assessment.
We found that households containing members of local forest
management associations (especially those containing a commit-
tee member), and those easily accessible and with higher food
security were more likely to be identiﬁed as PAPs. It is difﬁcult to
make a case that these characteristics are likely to be associated
with people most negatively impacted by the REDD+ project. We
argue it is more likely that membership of forest management
associations, and especially decision-making positions in these
associations, gives individuals more access to the external agents
involved in the safeguard assessment process, and makes them
better able to ensure that they, or their families, beneﬁt from the
compensation available. We are not suggesting corruption; we
have no evidence to suggest that the households identiﬁed as PAPs
do not bear costs from the REDD+ project, however we are
suggesting that by working through non-representative institu-
tions, the safeguard process is reinforcing existing social and
political power structures, and inequalities.
Elite capture of beneﬁts is a well-documented problem in
community-based conservation and development projects around
the world (Blom et al., 2010; Corbera and Pascual, 2012; Pascual
et al., 2014; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). In a recent study of one
REDD+ project in Indonesia, Howson and Kindon (2015) report that
locals with greater socio-economic power were able to skew the
access to beneﬁts in their favour. The potential for elite capture can
be minimised by working as directly as possible with the individual
households. However, in many cases, external agents (such as
those carrying out a safeguard assessment) may need to consult
existing institutions in order to gather information about house-
holds. These institutions should not be assumed representative of a
local community or their interests and any information must be
carefully triangulated to avoid undue inﬂuence on the safeguards
process.
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Our results suggest that carrying out an assessment to identify
individual households eligible to receive compensation in a REDD+
project is challenging, costly and likely to be prone to local elite
capture. Identiﬁcation of individual eligible households is made
challenging by poor information on location of populations (and
costs and logistical challenges of reaching all such households for
an assessment). Greater investment in improved mapping of local
populations, especially forest dwellers, and in clarifying land
tenure to know who has rights to the land affected by the project
before a REDD+ project is established could be an important part of
a solution (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Clear and strong tenure rights for
forest peoples is seen as one of the fundamental steps in ensuring
their rights to beneﬁt from future REDD+ projects (Ribot and
Larson, 2012; Sikor et al., 2010), especially amidst the concern that
REDD+ might encourage recentralisation of forest management
(Phelps et al., 2010). However, as Ribot and Larson (2012) argue,
clarifying rights will not be sufﬁcient—they have to be transparent
and enforced with sanctions for them to be effective and in order to
ensure accountability.
The challenges arising from people’s strategic behaviour in a
social safeguard assessment at the household level are more
difﬁcult to resolve. People will tend to understate their reliance on
land clearance if they perceive a risk of sanctions, and overstate
their reliance if they perceive a potential beneﬁt. Finally, any
external assessor may need information from existing institutions;
however, where such institutions are not representative, there is
additional potential for local social and political elites to bias the
process in their favour. One way around this dilemma could be to
do away with detailed assessments at the household level and
replace these with blanket compensation offered to all the
households in communities identiﬁed as potentially vulnerable.
This would be likely to be cost effective where the majority of
households are extremely poor and are likely to be relatively
similar in their socio-economic conditions and in their forest
dependency. Compensating everybody in the vulnerable commu-
nity would mean equal compensation at the household level
regardless of an individual household’s loss due to forest use
restrictions. In the case of CAZ safeguards the same compensation
was offered to households identiﬁed as eligible, regardless of the
magnitude of their loss (World Bank, 2012—note that we have not
evaluated whether this compensation was appropriate or sufﬁ-
cient). While the form and mechanism of compensation requires
careful consideration (and is beyond the scope of this paper), in
conditions where the majority of the households are likely to be
eligible for compensation and costs of eligibility assessment are
high, the optimal solution could be to compensate them all equally.
Those designing REDD+ social safeguard systems may wish to
consider the costs and beneﬁts of better targeting (which reduces
the number of false positives—households that are compensated
that should not be) relative to those of compensating extra
households, at the margin, to determine the “optimal” level of
targeting effort. However, the optimal strategy depends on the
viewpoint (whose optimum?). At a societal level, over-compensa-
tion is not a cost but a transfer (from rich to poor), and at worst
cancels out. Whereas targeting costs (paying consultants to carry
out extensive ﬁeldwork) is a dead weight cost. The optimal level of
effort given to targeting compensation will depend on how false
negatives (uncompensated households that bear net costs as a
result) decrease as targeting effort is increased relative to blanket
compensation, and how these are valued. To the REDD+
implementer, false negatives only matter if they are sanctioned
for not identifying the households who should have been
identiﬁed, while to society such false negatives may imply very
large welfare losses due to costs felt to people who are already verypoor. This highlights the need for REDD+ implementers to be
accountable for their decisions, and for households to be aware of
their rights and able to appeal decisions. Studies indicate that
donor-driven programs and their implementers are rarely evalu-
ated properly or sanctioned for failed outcomes (Martens, 2004;
Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Williamson, 2010). This would
suggest that a more effective strategy to avoid welfare losses in
the short run in cases like this might be to require implementers to
compensate every household in affected communities. The long-
term solution, however, must lie in ensuring the rights of local
communities and households are strengthened, including manda-
tory Free Prior Informed Consent, and in ensuring organisations
implementing programs like REDD+ are accountable to the local
communities by establishing accessible and robust appeals
procedures (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Ribot and Larson,
2012; Poteete and Ribot, 2011).
REDD+ is seen by some as an efﬁcient way to reduce emissions,
with potential additional beneﬁts in terms of providing funding for
alternative livelihood activities. However, unless social safeguard-
ing is being done properly it is simply a case of costs being borne by
those living in forest edge communities in the tropics, who are
often the poorest, are often historically marginalised, and have
contributed least to climate change. Strong and effectively-
enforced safeguards in REDD+ is a must if it is to avoid worsening
forest people’s historical exclusion from equitable beneﬁts (Sikor
et al., 2010).
5. Conclusion
Our study has highlighted problems that are familiar to any who
have studied conservation and development projects in low-
income countries over the last three decades. What is new and
worrying is that these problems, in particular that of local elite
capture, seem to exist even in projects that are supposed to be
inherently pro-poor, and that are supposed to be helping those
who are affected negatively by conservation projects. The
safeguards approach is often termed a ‘do-no-harm approach’ as
it is devised to minimise the potential negative impact of a policy
or a project (Hall, 2007). Safeguards in REDD+ should not just be
about ‘doing no harm’. To be able to effectively change the
livelihoods of some of the poorest peoples in forest dependent
communities, REDD+ should aspire to improve social and
ecological welfare wherever they are implemented, and REDD+
safeguards should guarantee that improvement in livelihoods and
social welfare are achieved. As Ribot and Larson (2012) state
(emphasis added): “If REDD is to challenge business as usual and to
beneﬁt local populations, safeguard policies must not just protect
rights, but must also establish, strengthen, and secure rights”. The
Paris Agreement gives explicit recognition of the need to respect
and promote human rights (especially those of vulnerable groups)
while taking actions to address climate change which is a welcome
step forward. However this research demonstrates that without a
more effective effort to understand the local context and
willingness to make special effort to reach the hard to reach,
even the aspiration of doing no harm could fail.
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